> Also, I believe research has shown that the size of a fine has relatively little effect, and it is the perception of the certainty of being caught that is most effective as a deterrent.
The original paper does note that the principle is limited to circumstances where catching is easy.
What the paper doesn't account for, though, is response: which allows a straightforward general counter-strategy:
The 'resistance' place a dummy wherever the 'police-state' target next -- to deceive or take the hit harmlessly. This simply turns the attack against itself: The police-state's strategy relies on: 1. announcing their next target; and 2. keeping that promise. The resistance exploits and completely negates that. To defeat that counter, the attack must disable itself.
The critical assumption behind the police-state's strategy is that the resistance is powerless, that they have no ability to respond. But there is enough evidence this would be foolish in the internet world. If the police-state has technical means to find targets, the resistance has technical means to fool or dodge them.
The original paper does note that the principle is limited to circumstances where catching is easy.
What the paper doesn't account for, though, is response: which allows a straightforward general counter-strategy:
The 'resistance' place a dummy wherever the 'police-state' target next -- to deceive or take the hit harmlessly. This simply turns the attack against itself: The police-state's strategy relies on: 1. announcing their next target; and 2. keeping that promise. The resistance exploits and completely negates that. To defeat that counter, the attack must disable itself.
The critical assumption behind the police-state's strategy is that the resistance is powerless, that they have no ability to respond. But there is enough evidence this would be foolish in the internet world. If the police-state has technical means to find targets, the resistance has technical means to fool or dodge them.