Trying to link this to the NSA data mining is absurd. They're tangentially related, but there is no process or regulation which is going to somehow help you when there's an active investigation and agents are digging through your garbage and talking to past contacts.
That's the exact purview of the FBI - they weren't mining databases, all they have to do is send a guy out to chat with some local base personnel, find out where he used to live, look up neighbours etc. This is all active, in-person investigative work.
"Because the FBI agents had no concrete evidence that Mayfield was linked to the Madrid train bombings, they decided not to apply for a criminal wiretap, which requires probable cause to believe there is criminal activity or intent. Rather, they applied for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant, ..." "The secret FISA court approved the request, as it almost always does, and the FBI began its surreptitious and incredibly intrusive blanket surveillance of Mayfield and his family."
Where did they dig up history? Where did they find details of his past? The FISA warrant was granted after the string of fairly notable coincidences. And was for ongoing active surveillance - not data mining his past.
Of course I don't know why I'm bothering at this point - remotely seeming like you disagree with the HN groupthink on surveillance topics is just a magnet for downvotes and not discussion.
In case you hadn't noticed, the article shows how awful things are already with lots of data that shows coincidences and convinces investigators of someone's guilt, even if it's absurd.
The government surveillance program gives MUCH more data to be misused.
But where the rubber meets the road is when they got a warrant to detain him on the grounds of his being a flight risk (which was utterly ridiculous if he didn't have a passport, and they were already allowed to carry out surveillance).
The guy was actively investigated - it's not like laws could be passed which are going to bar the FBI from investigating people who potentially are linked to major terrorist attacks, and doing things like asking co-workers, old neighbors, etc about them - or looking up court documents (which would show he was the lawyer on the cases he was on).
Which is my problem with the article - trying to frame this as a data collection issues is absurd. It's a procedure and institutional culture issue, and the big question is how a detention warrant was granted on such flimsy evidence. By focusing on a nebulous data collection issue, we in fact miss the important lesson and we're unlikely to change the part which has direct, real-world consequences (side note: 2 weeks detention is the same amount of time Australia's 'anti-terrorism' laws allow the federal investigators to detain you without notification or charge).
That's the exact purview of the FBI - they weren't mining databases, all they have to do is send a guy out to chat with some local base personnel, find out where he used to live, look up neighbours etc. This is all active, in-person investigative work.