If you care about your data then the erase will not protect you enough anyway, if you think it does then you've probably misunderstood the underlying architecture a little.
The data for your virtual machine's virtual disk(s) will not always be in the same place, it may get moved around the storage volume or moved between storage volumes and this will be completely transparent to you. It may also get stored on backup volumes too. When you "secure wipe" the disk as you kill the VM all you are doing it wiping the data that is in the current location not any latent copies that may be sat elsewhere (as backups or "ghost" data sat in currently unallocated bits of physical media).
The only way to grantee your data is stored securely and is gone securely when you want it gone, is to use full-volume encryption from the start and make sure that the key's are never stored at the provider side (this does mean that you need a mechanism by which you can provide the key(s) to the VM whenever it reboots for some reason). That way there is no need to wipe the current store or worry about ghost data elsewhere: just destroy all copies of the keys for those volumes. Of course there is still some risk as the keys need to be in RAM somewhere so the encrypted volumes can be accessed at all, but once you get to that level of concern you can only be sure you are secure by having your own physical kit.
Of course not all current hardware sharing solutions can support full volume encryption as you don't really have a proper volume(s) that you can encrypt and put filesystems in, just a part of a larger filesystem pretending to be one (and you can't mount things so you can't use a file-based volume instead)...
tl;dr: wiping the VM's disks does NOT protect you from this sort of thing, using properly implemented full volume encryption will (as much as is possible in a shared virtualisation host, iff your hosts's solution can support FVE in the guest VMs/containers at all).
You make it sound like there's no valid point of security in between "anti-the-next-random-guy" and "anti-sophisticated-governments." There are a lot of people who care about their data enough that it shouldn't be left lying around for passersby, but not so much that they're going to implement FDE. I'd call them "normal people."
The suggestion of using TRIM does not (in all cases) protect against accidental data visibility to the "next random guy", it doesn't even protect from some other current random guy as your container could have moved and left another user with access as their new container got created over the space you used to occupy - so unless you have another method that hasn't been discussed yet there isn't a point in between: you protect yourself from both or you protect yourself from neither.
If you need to be sure your instructions to wipe data do protect you from that random other guy then you either need to use good encryption (it doesn't have to be full volume encryption but once you get to the point of caring it is probably easier to go the whole hog than do it piecemeal) or you need to have dedicated physical storage (something a VPS provider generally doesn't offer.
Of course the provider could instigate full data wiping for all relevant operations, but that imposes I/O load that will affect all other users of the given host machine(s) unnecessarily (I say "unnecessarily" because most won't care as their bulk data is not sensitive and they've invalidated associated things like SSH keys anyway, the host will take the attitude that if your data is sensitive you need to take measures to protect it).
The data for your virtual machine's virtual disk(s) will not always be in the same place, it may get moved around the storage volume or moved between storage volumes and this will be completely transparent to you. It may also get stored on backup volumes too. When you "secure wipe" the disk as you kill the VM all you are doing it wiping the data that is in the current location not any latent copies that may be sat elsewhere (as backups or "ghost" data sat in currently unallocated bits of physical media).
The only way to grantee your data is stored securely and is gone securely when you want it gone, is to use full-volume encryption from the start and make sure that the key's are never stored at the provider side (this does mean that you need a mechanism by which you can provide the key(s) to the VM whenever it reboots for some reason). That way there is no need to wipe the current store or worry about ghost data elsewhere: just destroy all copies of the keys for those volumes. Of course there is still some risk as the keys need to be in RAM somewhere so the encrypted volumes can be accessed at all, but once you get to that level of concern you can only be sure you are secure by having your own physical kit.
Of course not all current hardware sharing solutions can support full volume encryption as you don't really have a proper volume(s) that you can encrypt and put filesystems in, just a part of a larger filesystem pretending to be one (and you can't mount things so you can't use a file-based volume instead)...
tl;dr: wiping the VM's disks does NOT protect you from this sort of thing, using properly implemented full volume encryption will (as much as is possible in a shared virtualisation host, iff your hosts's solution can support FVE in the guest VMs/containers at all).