The specific CALEA statute sections you're referencing are related to the "capability" to log detailed activity--not a mandate to do so outside of the auspices of wiretap warrant.
To limit exposure under common carrier safe harbor, and consequentially insurance premiums, most ISPs maintain only sparse activity logs and flush those on a periodic cycle.
These policies may also differ radically due to compliance with municipal and state laws (CALEA is federal) and/or private contractor facilities where "sensitive, classified, etc." work is undertaken.
To use an analogy, the phone company doesn't/can't record your conversations on a routine basis, merely the initiating and terminating routes. Still, they must have the "capability" of complying with a wiretap's mandates if called-on to do so. Don't get me started on the "warrant less wiretaps" fiasco.
I suspect that Microsoft could just as easily have an open WiFi network, but fine-grained policies go hand-in-hand with their corporate culture. Some would argue that Google's course-grained policies create their own set of problems. For a similar example, look at how hardware provisioning and technical support is done at both companies.
That's exactly what I meant -- they have to have the ability to associate an identity with an IP/active network connections, which usually means recording it at the time that access is first granted. (Doing otherwise usually indicates the to subject of surveillance that they are being watched, which is generally considered undesirable by the watchers.) Noting someone's name along with their DHCP lease is very much not the same thing as recording all traffic to and from that IP.
To limit exposure under common carrier safe harbor, and consequentially insurance premiums, most ISPs maintain only sparse activity logs and flush those on a periodic cycle.
These policies may also differ radically due to compliance with municipal and state laws (CALEA is federal) and/or private contractor facilities where "sensitive, classified, etc." work is undertaken.
To use an analogy, the phone company doesn't/can't record your conversations on a routine basis, merely the initiating and terminating routes. Still, they must have the "capability" of complying with a wiretap's mandates if called-on to do so. Don't get me started on the "warrant less wiretaps" fiasco.
I suspect that Microsoft could just as easily have an open WiFi network, but fine-grained policies go hand-in-hand with their corporate culture. Some would argue that Google's course-grained policies create their own set of problems. For a similar example, look at how hardware provisioning and technical support is done at both companies.