Hey, thanks for pointing that out. I may not have been clear about the position I was taking--that is, that submitting to punishment is not a necessary requirement for justifying civil disobedience, but is instead a feature found common among some civil disobedients. The core problem with the Slate article, in my opinion, is that it flaunts punishment as a requirement, thereby playing into the oversimplification of the now current treatment of Snowden as not a civil disobedient because he hasn't submitted to punishment.
Because my comments grew so long, I regrettably needed to sleep without digging into even further theories of and on punishment, which are central in treating not the justification of civil disobedience, but the just response to civil disobedience. Justification centers on the mode of action and motivations for action, not the results of action and punishment of action.
Furthermore, Slate's article offers examples of civil disobedients who submit to punishment in such a way that leaves readers continuing to expect that civil disobedience == breaking law + submission to punishment. This problem has plenty of historical counterexamples to distinguish disobedients from one another, and confuses submission to punishment as a requirement, instead of a feature. This is why I wrote, because Slate "fails to take on the challenge of disabusing people of their expectations that one must submit to egregiously harsh punishment to be validly considered a civil disobedient."
A primary example is that of revolutionaries, who often feature in discussion of civil disobedience. The American colonists who participated in the Boston Tea Party and other defiant actions were civil disobedients. Those who participated in the Arab Spring were, as well. Yet none of them submitted to punishment for their crimes, instead turning to work with other political participants to initiate a rebellion against what they perceived as a government that had departed from the principles of justice.
As far as the theorists go, Rawls certainly was of the opinion that willingness to accept punishment is a sign of fidelity to the legal system in which civil disobedience is engaged. However, that is not the same as saying it is a requirement or a distinguishing factor that makes some civil disobedients better than others. Submitting to punishment can be injurious and undesirable when it weakens or derails further attempts to effect change. It may also be detrimental when a disobedient has yet to complete disobedient acts that will call full public attention to the cause.
Ok, but you still need to distinguish between Snowden and the historical cases of civil disobedience where thinkers have agreed that submission to punishment was necessary for justification. Simply pointing to some revolutionaries which are commonly accepted by the public as justified is not enough. You need to engage the argument of MLK, Rawls, Gandhi, or whoever.
Would they have agreed that the revolutionaries were justified? Is Snowden closer to the revolutionaries, or to repressed blacks in 1963 Alambama?
Because my comments grew so long, I regrettably needed to sleep without digging into even further theories of and on punishment, which are central in treating not the justification of civil disobedience, but the just response to civil disobedience. Justification centers on the mode of action and motivations for action, not the results of action and punishment of action.
Furthermore, Slate's article offers examples of civil disobedients who submit to punishment in such a way that leaves readers continuing to expect that civil disobedience == breaking law + submission to punishment. This problem has plenty of historical counterexamples to distinguish disobedients from one another, and confuses submission to punishment as a requirement, instead of a feature. This is why I wrote, because Slate "fails to take on the challenge of disabusing people of their expectations that one must submit to egregiously harsh punishment to be validly considered a civil disobedient."
A primary example is that of revolutionaries, who often feature in discussion of civil disobedience. The American colonists who participated in the Boston Tea Party and other defiant actions were civil disobedients. Those who participated in the Arab Spring were, as well. Yet none of them submitted to punishment for their crimes, instead turning to work with other political participants to initiate a rebellion against what they perceived as a government that had departed from the principles of justice.
As far as the theorists go, Rawls certainly was of the opinion that willingness to accept punishment is a sign of fidelity to the legal system in which civil disobedience is engaged. However, that is not the same as saying it is a requirement or a distinguishing factor that makes some civil disobedients better than others. Submitting to punishment can be injurious and undesirable when it weakens or derails further attempts to effect change. It may also be detrimental when a disobedient has yet to complete disobedient acts that will call full public attention to the cause.