A red 'recording' light or shutter noise are not security theater. They're a feedback mechanism to notify subjects that they are being recorded. Even if 1 or even 10% of google glass users hack their device to remove the light, the other 90% will have the light and that will improve others' awareness of when they're being recorded and enable them to take action.
Incremental improvement is better than nothing, and this is an example of an incredibly cheap, obvious incremental improvement with no downside.
I think you're missing the point. Technology is going to continue to improve, components will continue to shrink, and cameras will become ever-more portable and concealable. These are trends that cannot be stopped. Google Glass is only one point along a continuum, and slapping a red LED on it solves nothing.
It's already the case that you are recorded without your knowledge or consent on a regular basis. Whether you're browsing a department store or planting a bomb at a marathon, there's a chance you'll be caught on tape.
Who knows what the world will be like in 10, 25, 50 years from now? We may be able to download a digital copy of memories from the brain, in which case every pair of eyes will be a video camera.
An extreme example, I know, but the point is simple. We can waste time and money fighting against the inevitable, or we can accept the changes in our world and learn to live with them.
The people who have reservations about insulting random people on the street, or farting loudly on a crowded bus, are likely going to have reservations about recording people whether there's a light on or not!
That is absolutely true, which is why the original article was about etiquette, not somehow creating supertechnology that can restrict a Glass user from doing bad things. That is, the LED is about feedback, not restraint.
My comment is about the suggestion of lights as a technical solution in past comment threads. It's not about the etiquette suggestions in this article.
You're completely missing the point. Traditional examples of 'security theater' like TSA screens are called security theater because they DON'T WORK.
A red light that says the camera is active works unless explicitly circumvented. Let me explain this in simple logic to you:
Your initial state is 'no red light when recording', which means 100% of strangers don't know if you're recording them. They will all assume you are an asshole.
If you add a red light that works by default, the new state is this:
Red light when recording, unless modified to remove the light. Most strangers may not know you can disable the light, so they won't worry. Strangers who do know will ask you if you are recording them. In cases where the light is on, then it's obvious - you're recording them.
Do you see how this works? It's almost as if seatbelts and helmets aren't useless just because you can take them off.
I really don't think I am, but perhaps it's an incompatibility in the way you're sending and I'm receiving.
TSA screenings work when not circumvented. When circumvented, you can bring a wide variety of weapons aboard a plane. Red lights on wearable computing devices work when not circumvented. When circumvented, your can record surreptitiously. They seem quite similar to me.
> If I add a red light that works by default ...
If I add a screening process that works by default ...
> Most strangers may not know you can disable the light ... so they won't worry ...
Like most people don't know that it's possible to get bombs through TSA checkpoints, so they don't worry. You're making the analogy more clear, not less.
TSA screenings DON'T WORK, PERIOD, END SENTENCE. This is why they are called security theater, instead of ineffectual security.
Or to give a more clear example, compare the TSA with customs. Customs does, in fact, do a very effective job of stopping certain kinds of contraband from crossing the border. They don't stop ALL OF IT, but they stop some. So when evaluating Customs, you have to decide whether they are simply inefficient, or not good enough at their jobs, or acceptably effective. In comparison, TSA literally does jack shit. Nothing. Which is why it's called security theater.
Whether or not it's appropriate to call something security theater also depends on the stakes involved; TSA screenings are considered inappropriate and unacceptable because the cost incurred by the screenings is high (in time, dignity, etc) and the payoff is low - it's a net loss.
Adding a red light costs literally nothing - cents on the dollar - and inconveniences no one. Even if... let's say 25% of google glass customers turn the LED off, the other 75% haven't so it's still working. You can very easily do a cost/benefit analysis here and it is hard to come up with a sane analysis where the LED isn't worth the cost.
If you're going to throw terms around, you should at least make a basic attempt to understand what they actually mean.
Let me make sure I understand. Are you saying that, 100% of the time, packing a gun in your carry-on won't get caught by a TSA screening? If not, what do you mean exactly by "don't work, period."
TSA screenings weren't introduced to prevent guns from being packed in suitcases; we had luggage screenings and customs beforehand.
TSA screenings were introduced to stop terrorists from hijacking airplanes.
EDIT: On the assumption that you will continue to display top-notch reading comprehension:
"The TSA was created as a response to the September 11, 2001, attacks. Its first administrator, John Magaw, was nominated by President Bush on December 10, 2001, and confirmed by the Senate the following January. The agency's proponents, including Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, argued that only a single federal agency would better protect air travel than the private companies who operated under contract to single airlines or groups of airlines that used a given terminal facility.
The organization was charged with developing policies to protect U.S. transportation, especially in airport security and the prevention of aircraft hijacking."
> To stop terrorists from hijacking airplanes . . .
. . . by preventing them from carrying weapons onto those planes. Yes? So, going back to my original questions, if the screenings are security theater, according to your definition, they should be 100% ineffective at that job without any attempt at circumvention. Or have I read you incorrectly somewhere along the lines?
All that stuff about the purpose of the TSA organization in your edit is useless, because I'm specifically talking about the screening procedures.
> . . . by preventing them from carrying weapons onto those planes. Yes? So, going back to my original questions, if the screenings are security theater, according to your definition, they should be 100% ineffective at that job without any attempt at circumvention.
This is wrong on several levels: first, it ignores the fact that security screenings existed prior to the establishment of the TSA. So the TSA screenings could have no value for actual security without being 100% ineffective, if they were no more effective than the preexisting screenings.
And second, because something can be security theater and still have some positive effect on security, if that positive effect is both not its primary motivation and not remotely warranted by the cost.
Security theater doesn't mean that there is no gain in security, it means that the security function is pretextual and any security effect is incidental.
Really, preboarding screenings were nationalized under the TSA to reduce the scope of potential future liability faced by airlines, who (through contractors) were previously responsible. It's not like the screenings didn't exist before 9/11, it's just different people were signing the screener's paychecks.
