It is a weird form of centralized planning. Except there's no election to get on to the central committee, it's like in the Soviet era where you had to run in the right circles and have sway in them.
There's too much group-think in the executive class. Too much forced adoption of AI, too much bandwagon hopping.
The return-to-office fad is similar, a bunch of executives following the mandates of their board, all because there's a few CEOs who were REALLY worked up about it and there was a decision that workers had it too easy. Watching the executive class sacrifice profits for power is pretty fascinating.
Edit: A good way to decentralize the power and have better decision making would be to have less centralized rewards in the capital markets. Right now are living through a new gilded age with a few barons running things, because we have made the rewards too extreme and too narrowly distributed. Most market economics assumes that there's somewhat equal decision making power amongst the econs. We are quickly trending away from that.
The funniest thing is that somehow the executive class is even more out of touch than they used to be.
At least before there was a certain common baseline derived from everyone watching the same news and reading the same press. Now they are just as enclosed in their thought bubbles as everyone else. It is entirely possible for a tech CEO to have a full company of tech workers despising the current plan and yet that person being constantly reinforced by linkedin and chatgpt.
The out of touch leader is a trope that I'm willing to bet has existed as long as we've had leaders.
I remember first hearing the phrase "yes man" in relation to a human ass kisser my dad worked with in like 1988.
It's very easy to unknowingly surround yourself with syncophants and hangers on when you literally have more money than some countries. This is true now and has been true forever. I'm not sure they're more out of touch, as much as we're way more aware?
It's more than the fact they are surrounded by sycophants. It's also that, despite the mythology the executive-worship-industry tries to paint, CxOs and board members of companies are just not very creative or visionary people. They largely spend their time looking at their peers and competitors for hints about what they should be doing. And today, those hints all are "do AI". They're not sitting down and deriving from first principles that AI is the way--they're seeing their buddies steering other companies and they're all saying AI is the way, so they say AI is the way, too.
> They're not sitting down and deriving from first principles that AI is the way--they're seeing their buddies steering other companies and they're all saying AI is the way, so they say AI is the way, too.
I think you're underestimating a bit. We must implement AI because they were able to sell it so good that they got billion $ investors (see all the money coming from Qatar/saudi arabia etc). That's a lot of money coming in that allows to innovate/etc.
But that thing they all were peddling and getting investors over could be anything! For a while it was "blockchain." Everyone had to do blockchain because everyone was doing blockchain, and investors were giving you money if you say blockchain. I wonder what it will be once the AI bubble bursts.
I swear that every 5-10 years, corporate CEOs all get together in a secret meeting where they all agree on the next buzzword technology. They invite Harvard Business Review and the tech press to give them their marching orders. Then, finally, the white smoke comes forth from the chimney indicating the next bubble buzzword has been chosen, and the industry goes bananas over it for 10 years for no reason.
You have to be honest, though, and admit that ChatGPT/LLMs are usable/used by literally everyone. Crypto is still perceived as a way to fund criminality. Not comparable to be honest.
It "could be anything", but the current AI trends/updates are really impressive. This is why they are investing.
If we reach a limit in the next 5 years, so be it. But it's driving and pushing for a paradigm shift in the way things work - search, coding, tooling, etc. It touches almost anything people do, not a specific group of people, but society as a whole.
Sounds quite a bit like stock market. The more sober and cynical of them see fads as fads, irrational but powerful movements, and ride the waves, selling to a greater fool.
Out-of-touch leaders existed for millennia. The "Emperor's New Clothes" tale was published in 1837 as a reproduction of a much older folk take. Sima Qian criticizes out-of-touch lords and emperors in his book about ancient history, written in 1th century BC. Maybe there is even older evidence.
No surprise, the CxO class barely lives in the same physical world as us peasants. They all hang out together in their rich-people restaurants and rich-people galas and rich-people country clubs and rich-people vacation spots, socializing with other rich-people and don't really have a lot of contact with normal people, outside of a handful of executive assistants and household servants.
This was Lina Khan's big thing, and I'd argue that our current administration is largely a result of Silicon Valkey no longer being able to get exits in the form or mergers and IPOs.
Perhaps a better approach to anti-monopoly and anti-trust is possible, but I'm not sure anybody knows what that is. Khan was very well regarded and I don't know anybody who's better at it.
Another approach would be a wealth and income taxation strategy to ensure sigmoid income for the population. You can always make more, but with diminishing returns to self, and greater returns to the rest of society.
Sorry, how did she stand in the way of IPOs? She was against the larger players providing easy off-ramps to smaller players but I don’t recall anything about IPOs. Indeed, Figma’s IPO is precisely because she undid the pending Adobe / Figma merger if I recall correctly.
a better approach might be to farming out shares to stakeholders. that seems a lot more dynamic and self-correcting than periodic taxation battles after the fact
Khan was largely ineffectual. The current administration, if it can be blamed on SV at all, is more likely to be the result of Harris's insanely ill-timed proposal to tax unrealized capital gains just as election season was kicking into high gear.
IMO Khan was by far the best we've had in at least 2 decades. Her FCC even got a judge to rule to break up Google! The biggest downside Khan had was being attached to a 1 term president. There's just not that many court cases against trillion dollar companies you can take from investigation to winning the appeal on in 4 years
All true, and I'm not making a value statement about whether her influence was good or bad. However, Khan only threatened the oligarchs' companies, while Harris point-blank threatened their fortunes.
Don't pick a fight with people who buy ink by the barrel and bandwidth by the exabyte-second. Or at least, don't do it a month before an election.
The oligarchs hated Kahn with the intensity of a thousand burning suns. If you listened to All In all they were doing is ranting about her and Gary Gensler.
That being said, Kamala's refusal to run on Kahn's record definitely helped cost her the election. She thought she could play footsie with Wall Street and SV by backchanneling that she would fire Kahn, so she felt like she couldn't say anything good about Kahn without upsetting the oligarchs, but what she was doing was really popular.
She was largely ineffectual because she was cock-blocked by the ruling classes. I lean libertarian-capitalist and still I think this. Although it's not a settled debate in the classic liberal or libertarian traditions, there are plenty of arguments in them against the excessive concentration of power.
Samsung lost a large percentage of market share to their competitors in the last couple years, so I'm pretty sure they already have to participate in markets.
I think a better solution is exponential tax on a company size. I.e. once a company starts to earn above, say, 1 billion, it will be taxed by income by ever increasing amount. Or put it another way, use taxes to break the power law and winner takes effect all into a Gaussian distribution of company sizes.
> I think a better solution is exponential tax on a company size. I.e. once a company starts to earn above, say, 1 billion, it will be taxed by income by ever increasing amount.
This is in the right spirit but you want two things to be different about it.
The first is that the threshold for a given industry doesn't make sense as a dollar amount, it makes sense as a market share percentage. Having more than 15% market share should be a thing companies don't want, regardless of whether it's a $100 trillion industry or a $100 million one.
And the second is that taxes create a perverse incentive for the government. You absolutely do not want the government to have even more of a financial incentive to sustain and create more of the companies of that size. What you want is to have fewer of them.
So, what you want is a rule that if a company has more than 15% market share, the entire general public is allowed to sue them into bankruptcy for the offense of market consolidation. Which also removes the problem where they buy off the government prosecutors, because if they commit the offense then anybody can sue them.
And who determines what makes for a good market share size to be the threshold?
And by having such a rule, an industry that would have higher efficiency to when consolidated would not be able to (but you wouldn't know). It's a bad set of policy imho.
A better way would be for gov't to increase competition by adding supply, or demand, whichever one is the bottleneck to competition. If a company, such as AWS, is getting a lot of marketshare, but their profit margins is still high, then the gov't should incentivize competition by funding or giving loans to businesses that want to compete with AWS.
However, if AWS's profit margins, even at high market share, remains very low (e.g., amazon's commerce side), then there's no need for the gov't to "step in" at all, as there would be no incentive for any competitor to try enter the market due to low margins.
The goal is to not have it happen, because the company is going to see that they're only slightly below the threshold and voluntarily split themselves into smaller pieces and buy themselves a safety margin because if they don't everybody knows the lawsuits are going to vaporize them once they exceed the threshold.
> And who determines what makes for a good market share size to be the threshold?
Anything in the vicinity of 5%-15% would be fine.
> And by having such a rule, an industry that would have higher efficiency to when consolidated would not be able to (but you wouldn't know).
This is extremely rare and the circumstances where it happens aren't a mystery. It's when entering the market has extremely high fixed costs but then the unit cost of usage is negligible, e.g. it costs a huge amount of money to install water and sewer but then the incremental cost of someone washing their hands is insignificant.
For those things you either have the government do them, or if it's a private company then it's a regulated utility which is completely banned from anything that even vaguely resembles vertical integration as the price of being allowed to have more than the threshold amount of market share.
> A better way would be for gov't to increase competition by adding supply, or demand, whichever one is the bottleneck to competition.
The problem is generally caused by the incumbents capturing the government and then enacting rules that inhibit rather than increase competition. That's why you need anyone to be able to initiate the lawsuit, so they can't capture the government department which is supposed to be thwarting them because then it's the entire public.
so why not solve this issue directly? Transparency, auditing and public awareness etc are needed to prevent regulatory capture. Public apathy are the reason why it is currently "easy" to do capture regulators.
The fact is even if a law suit is possible from anyone in the public, no one is going to pay to do a law suit (which has costs), when the result doesn't net them more profit. So unless the law suit enables the accuser to wholesale take a piece of that company as private property from the owners - which no law currently would allow nor have precedents for - why would anyone expend private money for a public good?
And in any case, i don't the apathy going away, even if the law suit was free. Because currently, the same apathy is allowing regulatory capture in the first place. So solving public apathy first, and foremost, is the solution.
> Transparency, auditing and public awareness etc are needed to prevent regulatory capture. Public apathy are the reason why it is currently "easy" to do capture regulators.
It's mostly easy because the people doing it are good at lying. When they create a rule it isn't called the "mandate this company's product rule" or the "increase fixed costs to lock out smaller competitors rule", it's sold as a safety measure or consumer protection or some other pretext, even though the effect is to raise costs to the benefit of the companies getting the money or exclude competitors to the benefit of the incumbents.
Or they simply don't prosecute antitrust violations, and then there is nothing to audit because there is nothing happening, meanwhile people are kept distracted with other things.
> The fact is even if a law suit is possible from anyone in the public, no one is going to pay to do a law suit (which has costs), when the result doesn't net them more profit.
It does net them more profit. The premise is that having more than the threshold amount of market share is a strict liability antitrust violation, which allows any customer or prospective customer (i.e. anyone) to sue them for it. The person who files the lawsuit would get the money, the same as someone who sues a company for pollution or fraud.
The point of letting people sue you for polluting or fraud or, in this case, market consolidation, isn't to make plaintiffs rich, it's to deter the thing you don't want companies to do. The goal isn't to have a lot of lawsuits, the goal is to have companies not want the market to consolidate and actively prevent it because if it happens they'll get sued.
> So solving public apathy first, and foremost, is the solution.
Apathy is cyclical. People don't care until the problem gets bad enough, then they care enough to demand change and make it go away for a while, then they stop caring until it gets bad enough again.
But you don't want people to have to die or get severely abused before the problem gets addressed. What you want is to change the structure of the system to prevent it from getting that bad to begin with, by making sure that the power to nip the problem in the bud (i.e. stop market consolidation at 5% or 15% instead of 50% or 90%) is held by someone who will actually exercise it, which can be accomplished by granting that power to everyone affected, which in this context is each and every member of the public.
> And the second is that taxes create a perverse incentive for the government. You absolutely do not want the government to have even more of a financial incentive to sustain and create more of the companies of that size. What you want is to have fewer of them.
That's not really a convincing argument. The government is the body for setting up the economic rules, it is not bound by it. The government doesn't have revenue or profit. Money is created by the government, it doesn't have a value yet. The direct financing of actions through taxes is not done for the government, but a way for the government to project the costs of the governmental action into the economy. Sure, there are a lot of idiots now-a-days, that think a state should work like a business and make profits, but they are misled.
> The government is the body for setting up the economic rules, it is not bound by it.
When a new law is proposed, the Congressional Budget Office prepares a report on the impact it will have on the budget.
Now suppose a new law is proposed that will remove an existing unfair advantage of large companies over small ones, causing more small companies to form and take market share from incumbent larger ones. If large companies pay a 50% tax rate and small companies pay a 10% tax rate, the CBO analysis will show tax revenue going down. Then in order to make up the shortfall at a given level of deficit spending, the government would have to raise taxes or reduce spending, both of which are unpopular, so instead the bill gets tabled and the huge companies retain their unfair advantage. That's the perverse incentive we don't want to see.
> Money is created by the government, it doesn't have a value yet.
If the government can create an unlimited amount of money with no drawbacks, why don't they just send everyone a check for a trillion dollars? If they can't then whatever they want to spend in excess of what they can get away with printing or borrowing has to come from tax revenues, and then what happens when you set up an incentive structure where the government gets more money to spend the bigger they allow companies to get?
> Sure, there are a lot of idiots now-a-days, that think a state should work like a business and make profits, but they are misled.
This is a straw man. The only people who think the government should make a net profit are the people trying to build some kind of sovereign wealth fund. The US government isn't doing anything even resembling that -- it has been running massive deficits for decades. It's to the point that interest on the debt is now a major component of the budget -- we're now spending about as much on interest as on Medicare.
This would permanently increase DRAM prices. Memory fabricators either earn billions of dollars in income each year or they can't keep going. There are no little Mom and Pop businesses that can do photolithography on leading process nodes.
Chip fabs used to be like book publishers; you don't have to own a printing press to be an author. Carver Mead even described his vision of the industry that way.
Nowadays you have to get your cell libraries and a large chunk of your toolchain from the fab. Of course it's laundered through cadence+synopsys, but it's still coming from the fab. You have to buy your masks from the fab (heck they aren't even allowed to leave the fab so do you really own them?). And on and on.
For the record I don't agree with the "exponential" part, but otherwise this is an underappreciated and powerful technique.
I can still make a book like that in my basement. People do this as a hobby now. You can still build chips like that in your garage. People do this as a hobby now.
These things DO NOT SCALE... you cant have 10,000 people running printing presses in their basement to crank out the NYT every day. A modern chip fab has more in common with the printer for the NYT than it does with what you can crank out in your garage.
Let's look at TSMC's plant in AZ. They went and asked intel "hey where are you sourcing your sulfuric acid from. When they looked at the American vendors TSMC asked intel "how are you working with this". Intels response was that it was the best they could get.
It was not.
TSMC now imports sulfuric acid from Taiwan, because it needs to be outrageously pure. Intel is doing the same.
Every single part, component, step and setup in the chain is like that. There is so much arcane knowledge that loss of workers represents a serious set back. There are people in the production chain, with PHD's, who are literally training their successors because thats sort of the only option.
Do you know who has been trying the approach you are proposing? China. It has not worked.
Complexity of the fab processes is isn't what the parent was talking about. They're talking about the major changes in the relationship between fabless semiconductor companies and commercial foundries.
The complexity of actual fabrication was always, and still is, entirely within the foundry. But in the early days of that model, designs could be more easily handed off at the logical level, leaving the physical design to back end companies, which makes designs much more portable between foundries. (The publisher analogy.) What's changed is that the complexity of physical design has exploded, and you can't make the handoff at nearly as high a level, and there is much more work that depends directly on the specific process you are targeting. Much more work at the physical level falls to the fabless semi companies. So it is much more work to retarget a design to a different foundry or process.
> I can still make a book like that in my basement. People do this as a hobby now. You can still build chips like that in your garage. People do this as a hobby now.
You can absolutely manufacture a convincingly-professional, current-generation book in your basement with a practically-small capital investment.
You cannot manufacture a convincingly-professional chip (being generous: feature size and process technology from the last two decades) in your basement without a 6-7 figure capital expenditure, and even then - good luck.
In another comment you proposed a sane version of the parent proposal. I wouldn't have commented if fpoling had originally floated that scheme. I was mainly objecting to drastically increasing taxes "once a company starts to earn above, say, 1 billion" without regard for the minimum viable scale of different businesses.
Is that revenue, or profit? If revenue, it'll slam certain kinds of high-volume low-profit businesses, and if it's profit then the company will just arrange to have big compensation "expenses" for executives.
The latter would have to be backstopped by taxes on individual income.
The sane version of this proposal omits the "exponential" part, applies to profits (net income), and makes the tax rate industry-specific (just like Washington State's revenue tax).
> There's too much group-think in the executive class.
I think this is actually the long tail of "too big to fail." It's not that they're all thinking the same way, it's that they're all no longer hedging their bets.
> we have made the rewards too extreme and too narrowly distributed
We give the military far too much money in the USA.
Diversity is good for populations. If you have a tiny pool of individuals with mostly the same traits (in this case I mean things like culture, education, morality, ethics, rather than class and race - though there are obvious correlations) then you get what some other comments are describing as being effectively centralized planning with extra steps, rather than a market of competing ideas.
Sadly natural result of industries where economies of scale and price of entry make anyone not massive uncompetitive.
I don't think there is even a good solution for that. Govt could essentially sponsor some competition but that's easy to go from "helping to market" to "handouts for incompetent"
> We give the military far too much money in the USA.
~ themafia, 2025
(sorry)
On a more serious note the military is sure a money burning machine, but IMHO it's only government spending, when most of the money in the US is deliberately private.
The fintech sector could be a bigger representation of a money vacuuming system benefiting statistically nobody ?
It's around 3.4% GDP. That puts us in the top 10% or so worldwide, but it's not ridiculously high. It's on a similar level as countries such as Morocco and Colombia, which aren't known for excessive military spending. It's still kind of high for a country with no nearby enemies, but for the most part, US military spending is large because the US economy is large.
It's around 16% of the total federal budget. To be fair about 1/3 of "military spending" is actually Salaries, Medical, Housing and GI/Retirement costs.
It's also the case that none of the CIA, NSA or DHS budgets show up under the military, even though they're performing some of the same functions that would be handled by militaries in other countries.
We also have "black appropriations." So the total of the spending on surveillance and kinetic operations is often unknowable. Add to this the fact the Pentagon has never successfully performed an audit and I think people are right to be suspicious of the topline "fraction of GDP" number.
Military spending is a type of wealfare for the wealthy it is one of the only forms of public or government spending that doesn't crowd out private investors, the way public housing or publicly funded hospitals do. The high military spending and the contractor class often vote more conservative than typical for their demographic and economic peers It's been high since WW2, with maybe a slight drop in the late 70s. The current stat of "3.4 times gdp" ignores the fact that a large part of our national debt is from the military and war budgets. I saw a statistic in the mid 1990s that if we had kept our military budget at inflation adjusted levels equal to 1976 our debt would have gone to zero as early as 1994.
Our national debt is from our unwillingness to raise taxes to balance the budget. Federal spending is somewhat high historically, but not absurdly so. Relative to the economy, it's at about the same level as it was in the 1980s. Measured as a percentage of GDP, the current military budget is the lowest since before the Second World War, aside from a brief period at the end of the 1990s where it was slightly lower.
Comparing budgets by adjusting for inflation doesn't make any sense. A budget that served a country of 218 million in 1976 would, when adjusted for inflation, serve a country of 218 million in 2026. Percentage of GDP is what you want to look at.
But federal spending has been historically high ever since like the New Deal.
Budget-to-GDP ratio in the US is close to 40%. (On that note, you should really consider federal + state combined rather than just federal.)
In early 1900s this same ratio was around 5-10%.
It has been increasing pretty much everywhere during the 20th century. It has made me wonder whether much of the prosperity we've seen and felt might not be a result of this ever-increasing percentage. Essentially we're spending more and more and that makes it feel like we're progressing faster than we are. Eventually it's going to have to stop though and I dread what happens when we do.
The New Deal was 90+ years ago. At some point it stops being abnormally high and becomes just how things are done.
I don't see why we'd eventually have to stop this level of spending. The debt is unsustainable, but that's a policy choice to keep taxes too low for the level of spending we've chosen.
Exactly. So instead of electing the people who will allocate the resources, the people who are successful in one thing are given the right to manage the resources for whatever they wish and they can keep being very wrong for very long time when other people are deprived from the resources due to the mismanagement and can't do anything about it.
In theory I guess this creates a demand that should be satisfied by the market but in reality it seems like when the wealth is too concentrated in the hands of the few that call all the decision the market is unable to act.
This is why I think taxes on the very wealthy should be so high that billionaires can't happen. The usual reasons are either about raising revenue or are vague ideas about inequality. It doesn't raise enough revenue to matter, and inequality is a fairly weak justification by itself.
But the power concentration is a strong reason. That level of wealth is incompatible with democracy. Money is power, and when someone accumulates enough of it to be able to personally shake entire industries, it's too much.
You'll just get a different form of power concentration. Do you think the Soviet Union didn't have power concentration in individuals? Of course it did, that's why the general secretary of the party was more important than the actual heads of state and government.
No? I'm saying that power concentration is pretty much unavoidable. The question is more about what they can do with that power. I suspect that people getting more power through wealth in the modern world is better than people concentrating power through politics.
> I'm saying that power concentration is pretty much unavoidable.
It's avoidable by formalizing the execution of power. The head of state is very powerful, but he can't create laws or anything. That all needs to be done be the parliament, which is several hundred people.
Most democratic countries use the parliamentary system, where the party that wins elections creates the government through the prime minister. They are also the largest party in parliament.
Sure, the US does it differently, yet the parliament seems to often just not do anything and let courts legislate instead. Then you end up in this weird situation where the supreme court positions end up being extremely partisan to set the "correct" precedent.
Either way there's a lot of power in the executive in either system.
I don't think it's unavoidable. I don't see why you couldn't have a relatively weak government that's otherwise pretty laissez-faire besides taxing the hell out of extreme wealth. And a strong government doesn't have to have extremely powerful individuals. Power can be divided, and representatives are ultimately accountable to the people.
What you're saying basically boils down to: kings are inevitable, might as well choose them by economic success instead of the more old-fashioned approaches. I reject the first part.
You cannot have a "relatively weak government" that "taxes the hell out of the wealthy".
First, if the people can incentivize the government enough to tax the wealthy with outrageous amounts, then those same people will demand regulation on everything whenever something goes wrong. You end up with a poor country this way. Second, the wealthy can just leave or influence the policy to be changed.
Also, the irony is that the US is already one of the best countries when it comes to taxing the wealthy instead of the poor. You don't have a 20-25% VAT that applies to everything you buy. You have a progressive income tax and your payroll tax (that avoids the progressive part) isn't a giant ~30% of gross income. You don't have giant excise taxes on things like gasoline that makes everything more expensive (including food). You also generally don't have punitive taxes on things that poor people buy a lot of, like sodas and similar.
The list above are things that are done by (a lot of) European countries. Our "welfare states" don't exist because rich people pay a large share, it's because everyone does.
A centralized authority capable of so severely restricting the economic freedom of the most powerful people implies a far greater concentration of power than the one you're fighting against. You're proposing to cure the common cold with AIDS.
> A centralized authority capable of so severely restricting the economic freedom of the most powerful people implies a far greater concentration of power
Yes. That's the idea. Make the largest concentration of power an elected body auditable by the commons and whose actions are formalized by a bunch of rules, that they can choose, but still need to stick to.
> largest concentration of power an elected body auditable by the commons
So, billionaires are bad because they can use their money to enter into voluntary deals with other people, which can lead to them achieving goals we don't like. Therefore, we create a single point of concentration of power with totalitarian control and dictatorial powers, that can take resources from people they don't like and give those resources to others they do like.
And these people with totalitarian control over the commons and dictatorial powers over the commons and the most powerful lever on everyone whatsoever and especially on everyone with huge amount of money, will continue to be electable and auditable by the commons because... I don't know, probably because they feel like it, there is literally no other reasons or incentives for them to do so.
"Big money give a human to much power, so let's take all that power from EVERYONE, concentrate it in ONE PLAСE, and add to this power dictatorial powers and totalitarian control over society. Some might argue that this is the exact opposite of the stated goals of the whole undertaking, but they do not take into account the insurmountable protection in the form of MAGICAL RULES with the help of which society will be able to control all of this"
Gotta love libertarian thinking. In a society where survival requires participating in the economy, transacting with a billionaire is “voluntary.” Paying taxes on vast wealth you chose to accumulate, leaving you merely fabulously rich instead of wealthy beyond comprehension, is “involuntary.”
What matters to power is people, not places. Having power concentrated in one place, made up of hundreds of people who are elected and can be replaced, is fine. Having power concentrated in one or a few people is where things go wrong.
Centralized planning is needed in any civilization. You need some mechanism to decide where to put resources, whether it's to organize the annual school's excursion or to construct the national highway system.
But yeah in the end companies behave in trends, if some companies do it then the other companies have to do it too, even if this makes things less efficient or is even hurtful. We can put that onto the human factor, but I think even if we replaced all CEOs with AIs, those AIs would all see the same information and make similar decisions on those information.
There is pascal's wager arguments to be had: for each individual company, the punishment of not playing the AI game and missing out on something big is bigger than the punishment of wasting resources by allocating them towards AI efforts plus annoying customers with AI features they don't want or need.
> Right now are living through a new gilded age with a few barons running things, because we have made the rewards too extreme and too narrowly distributed.
The usa has rid itself multiple times of its barons. There is mechanisms in place, but I am not sure that people really are going to exercise those means any time soon. If this AI stuff is successful in the real world as well, then increasing amounts of power will shift away from the people to the people controlling the AI, with all the consequences this has.
If you get paid for being rich in proportion to how rich you are -- because that's how assets work -- it turns into an exponential, runs away, and concentrates power until something breaks.
Yea, ideally new companies should also be able to be born and have a chance to get a foothold. This sadly is not given and market economy must be regulated to provide this feature.
> Every corporation is a (not so) little pocket of centrally planned economy.
This is confused. Here is how classical economists would frame it: a firm chooses how much to produce based on its cost structure and market prices, expanding production until marginal cost equals marginal revenue. This is price guided production optimization, not central planning.
The dominant criticism of central planning is trying to set production quantities without prices. Firms (generally) don’t do this.
> This is confused. Here is how classical economists would frame it: a firm chooses how much to produce based on its cost structure and market prices, expanding production until marginal cost equals marginal revenue. This is price guided production optimization, not central planning.
That's the case in a healthy competitive market. Once you have a monopoly or an oligopoly, you get into central planning territory.
Ok, but recall the context (see above): I’m saying one can understand how firms operate without making a connection to central planning (setting production targets and investment decisions from the top-down without prices).
Economists have concepts and models for monopolies and oligopolies — and the way they operate are quite different from the practice of central planning.
I’m talking from within the frame of economic concepts, and I’m striving to use words as understood in the field. At times I value metaphorical thinking, but here in the case of economics, we don’t need to bend words when other fitting concepts are readily available and battle-tested.
An example: If someone calls corporate consolidation “central planning,” they’ve lost the ability to analyze it properly. The relevant questions for oligopolies (strategic behavior, barriers to entry, tacit collusion) are completely different from central planning questions (calculation problems, information aggregation, incentive alignment).
When technical fields have already solved a conceptual problem through careful definition and model building, importing loose metaphorical language degrades analytical clarity.
If you want to point to or propose a different model than the usual economic dogma, I’m all ears, by the way.
I agree, that this discussion isn't based on proper economic terms, but on laymen understanding.
The claim isn't that it is exactly like central planning like a state, but very similar through the view on the whole society. You have a powerful caucus, no longer bound by reality (competition), making decisions, that they think are good, which effectively set the pace for the whole economy field. Whether this caucus formed through rigged elections or by inheritance of companies isn't all that relevant. It would be quite a different story, if the state would enforce its monopoly on (political) power and governing, but it refuses to do so now-a-days.
> The relevant questions for oligopolies (strategic behavior, barriers to entry, tacit collusion) are completely different from central planning questions (calculation problems, information aggregation, incentive alignment).
The observation on these oligopolies, that are now larger than some states is, that they seem to lack in their strategic reasoning and are more built on vibes of their leader, which is subject to blindness due to sycophants, much like in an authoritarian regime. Also they tend to treat the whole market as their internal planning problem.
> but here in the case of economics, we don’t need to bend words when other fitting concepts are readily available and battle-tested.
I think a majority of commenters on HN are not as well-versed in Economics as you, so would value elaboration on modern monopolies. I think they differ a bit from classical monopolies in their amount of ties to the government and interference into elections. Not that lobbying isn't typical for monopolies, but modern monopolies seem to not need to lobby anymore, but simply do and dictate.
> The observation on these oligopolies, that are now larger than some states is, that they seem to lack in their strategic reasoning and are more built on vibes of their leader…
Yes, there are several problems with oligopolies and monopolies. You referred to one: a kind of blinkered irrationality. Also, capable and strategic self-interest can threaten free markets.
I don’t expect readers here to have the equivalent of a US bachelor degree in economics (though I think this is likely to be a valuable skillset to learn in one’s free time).
Still, I’m hoping they can recognize when they’re stepping into an unfamiliar realm and pay attention to the feeling of “seems like economists are using certain words in particular ways that I should dig into rather than treat them as known vocabulary.” Achieving this level of self-awareness is probably hard for many. To build a deep sense of intellectual honesty and self-awareness of one’s cognitive limitations, I think one can do worse than working closely and intensely with others who also care about these traits. Mentorship helps.
Back to Econ… It also helps to remember in much of economists, these terms are founded in mathematical models. So the interpretation might be subjective, but the mathematical model (the operations) are formalized.
Company prices resources within itself completely arbitrarily. How much the hour of work of an employee A is worth with the company and and how much using paperclip costs has no relation how much these things actually cost in the real money. Once they are acquired by company they are utilized not according to their value but to central plans instead. This way paperclip might get vastly overvalued and scarce while hour of work can be vastly undervalued and wasted.
To make sure we’re on the same page… In economics, “central planning” refers to a system where a central authority (typically the state) makes comprehensive decisions about production, investment, and resource allocation across an entire economy, replacing market mechanisms. This is associated with command economies like the Soviet Union’s Gosplan system.
And of course I will grant firms use hierarchical coordination mechanisms internally (managers allocate resources by command rather than prices).
I suppose my angle here is to be clear that firms are typically a kind of hybrid entity: they mix various coordination mechanisms (prices and hierarchy). This makes them quite different from centrally planned economies.
I’ve worked at many companies with market mechanisms of sorts in play enough to matter. As one example, product lines that do better (as evidenced by market feedback) get more clout and revenue and command more influence. As another, there are a wide variety of ad-hoc teams that form not because of hierarchy but because people have learned who they like working with and have seen results with. These are closer to markets than C&C or hierarchical decision making.
Next, to avoid a definitional stalemate and talking past each other, let me try a different angle. If you want to predict what a company will do next, what mix of models do you use upon?
If I were to predict a company’s production choices, I would model them as being very sensitive to costs and changing dynamics to maximize profit . I would not do that when modeling a centrally planned economy. For that I would use longer time scales and do long supply chain analysis in the service of a social welfare function. See what I mean? What am I missing from your POV?
Product lines with market sales are downstream of markets. The degree of per-product profit matters.
If you want to add “politics” to your causal map, that’s fine too. Reality is multi-factor. I do not deny that leaders make (to varying degrees) political and-or command-and-control decisions. This was already baked into the conversational context. Please take the conversational history into account.
> Company prices resources within itself completely arbitrarily.
I wouldn’t phrase it this way — to me, this implies unpredictability and/or a lack of rationale. Perhaps you simply mean “internal managers at companies do not necessarily price resources using market mechanisms” which I would agree with.
Many fields of study give insight to the various kinds of distortions that arise from human psychology and negotiation, etc.
how is this centralized planning? It’s a corporate decision making operating in a free market to optimize for what majority shareholders want (though the majority of shares are owned by few).
I think the implied thought (?) is there is a similarity between central planning and oligopoly bandwagoning. To my eye, the causes and dynamics are different enough to warrant bucketing them separately.
>It is a weird form of centralized planning. Except there's no election to get on to the central committee, it's like in the Soviet era where you had to run in the right circles and have sway in them.
No, it's pure capitalism where Atlas shrugged and ordered billions worth of RAM. You might not like it but don't call it "centralized planning" or "Soviet era".
There's too much group-think in the executive class. Too much forced adoption of AI, too much bandwagon hopping.
The return-to-office fad is similar, a bunch of executives following the mandates of their board, all because there's a few CEOs who were REALLY worked up about it and there was a decision that workers had it too easy. Watching the executive class sacrifice profits for power is pretty fascinating.
Edit: A good way to decentralize the power and have better decision making would be to have less centralized rewards in the capital markets. Right now are living through a new gilded age with a few barons running things, because we have made the rewards too extreme and too narrowly distributed. Most market economics assumes that there's somewhat equal decision making power amongst the econs. We are quickly trending away from that.