Strongly agree that this one is both very fun to think about and rings true. I sometimes imagine imagine it as parallel to the advancement of the world of computers, which has sort of been like watching the development an entire civilization in miniature. Early computer pioneers were, we know, incredible minds whose talent was the very thing that put us on the hard road to progress. Sure, nowadays, random people are able to casually accomplish much more in absolute terms, but it's because they're standing on the shoulders of giants.
All that said, I do tend to be sort of a Graham Hancock apologist. My take is that most people go too extreme with him. They either think he's a crackpot loony who must be taken at face value and debunked as a purveyor of pseudoscience OR they think he's a rebel truthteller: the only one who will look at the real facts, bravely pushing through the corrupt academic swamp.
It seems obvious to me that he's neither. He's just an author who stumbled on a compelling, mind-expanding idea. Roughly stated: what if we know less about the past than we think, and thus underestimate our ancestors? I think the interesting thing about Graham Hancock's spiel has nothing to do with any of his specific pieces of archaeological evidence that he digs up, which are very clearly marshaled to make a point he has already decided on making. (This is bad science, 100%.) Rather, the thing he brings to the table is more like a philosophical approach that is genuinely fresh and interesting. And I do think he will one day be vindicated in some way, because we act like we have way more precise knowledge about the past than we actually do. This is sort of an epistemology thing, so appealing directly to the evidence and the current anthropological understanding isn't really engaging with him in good faith. He's pointing out that the Troys of history prove that we consistently overestimate how completely we've understood history and what is and is not reasonable. Over time we tend to acclimate to that picture, and then the problem multiplies, because we tend to only accept things that seem to fit with the now-banal-seeming history we already know, leading to even more banal hypotheses gaining traction. Some of his best writings relate to the systematic bias against catastrophism that existed, and showing how these types of errors in epistemology lead to actual errors of science down the line.
All that said, I do tend to be sort of a Graham Hancock apologist. My take is that most people go too extreme with him. They either think he's a crackpot loony who must be taken at face value and debunked as a purveyor of pseudoscience OR they think he's a rebel truthteller: the only one who will look at the real facts, bravely pushing through the corrupt academic swamp.
It seems obvious to me that he's neither. He's just an author who stumbled on a compelling, mind-expanding idea. Roughly stated: what if we know less about the past than we think, and thus underestimate our ancestors? I think the interesting thing about Graham Hancock's spiel has nothing to do with any of his specific pieces of archaeological evidence that he digs up, which are very clearly marshaled to make a point he has already decided on making. (This is bad science, 100%.) Rather, the thing he brings to the table is more like a philosophical approach that is genuinely fresh and interesting. And I do think he will one day be vindicated in some way, because we act like we have way more precise knowledge about the past than we actually do. This is sort of an epistemology thing, so appealing directly to the evidence and the current anthropological understanding isn't really engaging with him in good faith. He's pointing out that the Troys of history prove that we consistently overestimate how completely we've understood history and what is and is not reasonable. Over time we tend to acclimate to that picture, and then the problem multiplies, because we tend to only accept things that seem to fit with the now-banal-seeming history we already know, leading to even more banal hypotheses gaining traction. Some of his best writings relate to the systematic bias against catastrophism that existed, and showing how these types of errors in epistemology lead to actual errors of science down the line.