There's some sleight of hand in this comment on multiple levels.
> going off this table [1] there is pretty wide disagreement of what constitutes open source between different groups
Since that's not what the table represents, that's not a reasonable conclusion supported by the data in the table alone. (Coincidentally, this is the same principle undergirding Kyle's issue with OSI's post drawing unsound inferences from the Neo4J Sweden decision.)
To start with, something can be GPL-incompatible without any implication about whether it's open source or not. In the second instance, something can be approved for use in the Debian project or not, but—again—that's a separate question from "Is there any legitimacy to the position that satisfying the criteria described in the Open Source Definition is a necessary precondition to being able to call something 'open source'?" NB: maintaining mental clarity about the separation between the legitimacy of that definition and the OSI's authority to "rule" on any given "record" (i.e. the legitimacy of the OSI's power, esp. in future findings) is important. Recognizing a definition as normative is a wholly separate matter from determining who gets to adjudicate whether something meets that standard.
> to claim without qualification that you alone get to define and arbitrate that seems pretty crazy to me
See, that's different even still! Agreeing that a given definition is legitimate is not the same as anointing any given group and its future findings as authoritative.
To use an example: we can agree that "fair use" is described in Title 17 and subsequent case law. In a fair use dispute, this would not be the point of contention—both parties would acknowledge this. Which party would prevail in their action, however, would depend on a finding of fact by the courts: how the definition applies to the parties' circumstances—not whether the definition is legitimate.
>Agreeing that a given definition is legitimate is not the same as anointing any given group and its future findings as authoritative.
Clearly you didn't read the OSI blog post that this blog post is referencing
>The court only confirmed what we already know – that “open source” is a term of art for software that has been licensed under a specific type of license, and whether a license is an OSI-approved license is a critically important factor in user adoption of the software.
> going off this table [1] there is pretty wide disagreement of what constitutes open source between different groups
Since that's not what the table represents, that's not a reasonable conclusion supported by the data in the table alone. (Coincidentally, this is the same principle undergirding Kyle's issue with OSI's post drawing unsound inferences from the Neo4J Sweden decision.)
To start with, something can be GPL-incompatible without any implication about whether it's open source or not. In the second instance, something can be approved for use in the Debian project or not, but—again—that's a separate question from "Is there any legitimacy to the position that satisfying the criteria described in the Open Source Definition is a necessary precondition to being able to call something 'open source'?" NB: maintaining mental clarity about the separation between the legitimacy of that definition and the OSI's authority to "rule" on any given "record" (i.e. the legitimacy of the OSI's power, esp. in future findings) is important. Recognizing a definition as normative is a wholly separate matter from determining who gets to adjudicate whether something meets that standard.
> to claim without qualification that you alone get to define and arbitrate that seems pretty crazy to me
See, that's different even still! Agreeing that a given definition is legitimate is not the same as anointing any given group and its future findings as authoritative.
To use an example: we can agree that "fair use" is described in Title 17 and subsequent case law. In a fair use dispute, this would not be the point of contention—both parties would acknowledge this. Which party would prevail in their action, however, would depend on a finding of fact by the courts: how the definition applies to the parties' circumstances—not whether the definition is legitimate.