If you’ve read the book, thoughts on this criticism of the book listed in the Wikipedia article?
> Stanford University political scientist David D. Laitin described it as "a magisterial book." But he said there were flaws in the methodology of the book, saying the book "is a product of undisciplined history. For one, Scott’s evidence is selective and eclectic, with only minimal attempts to weigh disconfirming evidence... It is all too easy to select confirming evidence if the author can choose from the entire historical record and use material from all countries of the world."
Any synoptic work can be criticised on the basis that its author strays from areas of specific expertise and selects from available evidence or narratives.
That criticism is akin to critiquing water for being wet.
The question is whether or not the book provides useful insights. And to that extent, I believe James C. Scott accomplishes his task. He needn't be correct in all his diagnoses or prescriptions for this to be true.
Appropriate consideration of disconfirming evidence is a valid concern, though I'd have to see what Laitin is proposing in that regard to see if that critque has merits.
What's all the more amusing is that the criticism is fundamentally grounded in the same fundamental paradox that states face, per Scott: that a complex domain cannot be accurately modeled or understood, that all attempts to do so are at best compromises and in error, and that any model will prove insufficient and unequal to the task.
> per Scott: that a complex domain cannot be accurately modeled or understood, that all attempts to do so are at best compromises and in error, and that any model will prove insufficient and unequal to the task.
Ahh, interesting. I believe that most modern scientists would reject that proposition, a priori. Millennia of scientific advancements have shown that complex systems can indeed be modeled. Recent advancements in mathematics have shown that self-correcting simulations are certainly possible (deep learning, for example). Science itself could be simply described as a “self-correcting model with built-in error checking”.
His argument is more nuanced, and ... includes examples.
I've only managed about 3 chapters of the book so far. It has proved quite illuminating.
There are examples of systems that do model well and those that don't. Depending on your physics, the 3, 2, 1, or null-body problems. The double pendulum. Etc.
And those are only at the very simplest level.
The fact that some systems can be effectively modelled doesn't mean that all can be. And in the case of complex systems (e.g., the German "rational forestry" method described early in Scott's book), initial success may preceed subsequent catastrophe.
> The fact that some systems can be effectively modelled doesn't mean that all can be.
Based on my understanding, the leading-edge of scientific research shows that “if the human mind can comprehend it, then there is a mathematical function for it”
Are you positing, then, that there simply are limits to what humans can understand? Or, rather, that some systems are just too complex to document properly?
> What's all the more amusing is that the criticism is fundamentally grounded in the same fundamental paradox that states face, per Scott: that a complex domain cannot be accurately modeled or understood, that all attempts to do so are at best compromises and in error, and that any model will prove insufficient and unequal to the task.
I now understand why you consider it amusing; thanks for your insights on this topic.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seeing_Like_a_State