As I recall this was Cuba's argument after the failed bay of pigs invasion. They asked for nuclear weapons on their soil and the USSR agreed to provide them.
The US took a dim view of it if I recall correctly.
When the defence of the heartland is threatened, notions such as sovereignty tend to take a back seat and invasion is very much on the table.
Strategically the Ukrainian border is kind of like Russia's jugular. Hence the insistence that NATO membership is a red line.
> Strategically the Ukrainian border is kind of like Russia's jugular.
How true is this since circa 1950, though? There are very few plausible scenarios involving a ground invasion and most of Russia is exposed to modern weaponry so it’s not like the primary threat is a bunch of B-52s flying out of Kyiv. It’s true that distance affects reaction times but they already have similar range borders & submarine launches substantially affected that, too.
Long range, aircraft launched, deployed hypersonic nuclear delivery systems will render this even more moot, relative to the current status quo, in the next 20 years.
At the end of the day, it appears Russia wants eastern Europe politically.
Until they can accept it as independent and sovereign, any protestations about military systems are smoke screens for their general unhappiness with an independent eastern Europe.
The US took a dim view of it if I recall correctly.
When the defence of the heartland is threatened, notions such as sovereignty tend to take a back seat and invasion is very much on the table.
Strategically the Ukrainian border is kind of like Russia's jugular. Hence the insistence that NATO membership is a red line.