Low-tax countries in the EU are being ruthlessly isolated already. This has been happening for some 15 years now, and accelerated after Brexit; covid might well be the nail in the coffin.
I am also sceptical of your claim that jurisdictions like Georgia and Malaysia are "less prone to leverage" - their proximity to large adversaries actually makes them more dependent on soft-power diplomacy to maintain big friends.
Obviously the likes of Russia and China might not play ball - but they have much bigger issues to worry about, from a capitalistic perspective. You put your money into China, you can't pull it out ever again; you put your money into Russia, and tomorrow it might well be Putin's money.
> Low-tax countries in the EU are being ruthlessly isolated already.
In what way? How is life for anyone in say Ireland or the Netherlands or the Bahamas materially different than, say, 20 years ago? Are they not allowed to travel somewhere? Obtain visas? Purchase goods and services from abroad? Are airlines refusing to land there? Even a single example of this "ruthless isolation" would be nice to show, otherwise, I suspect this is more of a dream sequence than a description of reality.
> their proximity to large adversaries actually makes them more dependent on soft-power diplomacy to maintain big friends.
Considering how the west interacted with the Crimea takeover I'm pretty sure these countries have realized by now that the west doesn't really care about their protection.
> This has been happening for some 15 years now, and accelerated after Brexit; covid might well be the nail in the coffin.
Estonia will be a useful barometer to keep an eye on for this in the future, but since their tax rate is actually basically in line with this floor anyway it may well be that this just doesn't affect them at all.
> their proximity to large adversaries actually makes them more dependent on soft-power diplomacy to maintain big friends.
Georgia already has recent experience with such relationships not keeping the bear at bay so may well view the extra capital from remaining an attractive tax friendly jurisdiction as more useful than bowing to parties who have already failed them in the recent past.
Malaysia seems even less likely to buckle to the "international order" as they have neither the cultural homogeneity nor the magnitude of the threat that Georgia has.
> You put your money into China, you can't pull it out ever again; you put your money into Russia, and tomorrow it might well be Putin's money.
When what your money gets you is absolutely nothing, one parasite is just as bad as another in the long run, it just becomes a question of which one costs you more. Russia and China have to restrain themselves in the looting sector less and less to the extent that their US & EU competition go all out in order to look like better alternatives.
And then, there's the implications of an extortion war across the global economy providing capital flight impetus to push the cryptosphere to obscene heights and complete inability to tax in a worst case scenario.
I think the fundamental fact of the issue will remain that as long as it's a forced payment not linked at all to delivery or quality of goods or services, all rational parties will be forever motivated to avoid it to the maximum extent possible, as it resolves to nothing more complex than "burning money" given what it actually buys you.
I am also sceptical of your claim that jurisdictions like Georgia and Malaysia are "less prone to leverage" - their proximity to large adversaries actually makes them more dependent on soft-power diplomacy to maintain big friends.
Obviously the likes of Russia and China might not play ball - but they have much bigger issues to worry about, from a capitalistic perspective. You put your money into China, you can't pull it out ever again; you put your money into Russia, and tomorrow it might well be Putin's money.