That document highlights Iran's government's objections to AIOC, and we have to contextualize those objections within the backdrop that Iran had already nationalized AIOC a year prior, and needed to justify its actions internationally in order to keep selling oil abroad. World Bank member nations and other buyers also needed to know they would not invite grievances with the UK by continuing to buy from a nationalized company.

The author of the document you cite says that prior to the 1933 agreement, AIOC withheld royalties under guise of covering damages but really to squeeze Iran into accepting the new agreement; the problem with this logic is that damage to a pipeline also causes revenue loss, so you can't indemnify the company by simply paying them for the repair costs. The 1901 agreement says that Iran will protect the infrastructure, which it failed to do. In any case, those payments were addressed in Article 23 of the new agreement.

It does not appear to me that Section II (D) demonstrates that the contractual stipulations you mentioned (training/hiring of locals and establishment of medical facilities at AIOC sites) were violated. That part of the document also says nothing about infrastructure investment. Maybe I am missing something but I have read it three times now to make sure.

I don't see how Section II (D) could be any clearer. The agreement stipulates a reduction of foreign staff in Article 16 (III), and the document shows a substantial increase. The agreement stipulates the development of sanitation, health services, and housing meeting the most modern standards found throughout Iran in Article 17, and the document shows that workers live in unsanitary tent cities.