The attacks are different, though. Under Certificate Transparency, approximately no one can issue a microsoft.com certificate and get away with it. Under a DNS-based system, the domain registry can do whatever, and there's no effective way to distrust them - if Verisign (who still manages .com, but who was too incompetent to run a CA and sold it to people who have been hard at work trying to clean up the mess) does something unreasonable with .com, the only option is for Microsoft to find a different TLD.
Given that most of the problems with the CA system historically have not been active attacks but incompetence, I don't think we win much from moving to a system where we can, in fact, kick TURKTRUST out of the pool to one where the question is whether .tr remains part of the internet or not. If Verisign screws up with .com in any way short of revealing a letter from the FBI saying "Please help us MITM Windows Update," there will be immense pressure to allow Verisign to continue being the .com registry and continue holding the .com signing keys.
For similar reasons, I'm not convinced that moving from "Hundreds of unqualified companies could issue a bad cert, but hopefully they won't" to "One unqualified company could issue a bad cert, but hopefully it won't" is a meaningful benefit. It doesn't reduce the theoretical bounds on the attacks, and again in practice, these hundreds of companies haven't been misissuing. (The present story is about mis-delegating the power to issue revocation/non-revocation responses, which is certainly a problem, but only relevant in practice if there are actual end-entity certs that are misissued in the first place.) So while it certainly feels better to have fewer entities that can sign - and to be clear, I am all for distrusting many if not most of them - I don't think it addresses either the fundamental theoretical problems nor the actual real-world attacks.
> Verisign (who still manages .com, but who was too incompetent to run a CA and sold it to people who have been hard at work trying to clean up the mess)
The Verisign CA function was sold to Symantec. That name might ring a bell too, because with these CAs set to be distrusted as a result of Symantec's mismanagement the whole business was again sold to DigiCert in 2017.
I think the perverse part of your reasoning is that you think .com is trustworthy now. It's one of the worst run registries. Its popularity with businesses probably tells you more about how scammy most businesses are than whether .com is trustworthy, and not very much about either.
Not sure if you're directing that at me or the parent comment - my position is definitely that Verisign should not be trusted with certificate signing authority over .com. The comment I'm replying to seems to advocate Verisign (and nobody else) being able to issue microsoft.com certs, which I think is a bad idea.
If Microsoft is comfortable with microsoft.com despite the .com registry being appallingly run I don't see any problem with that, just as I wouldn't see any problem with Microsoft choosing to open a Microsoft store in the almost-abandoned decaying mall at the far edge of town whose only other tenants are a discount furniture store and a company that sells only a single item and never has any customers.
It's a mistake to separate out the certificate signing authority for different attention if it would be (as in DNSSEC) hierarchically constrained. Verisign can already screw up badly enough to cause Microsoft to lose control of microsoft.com or let somebody else have it. They've apparently decided they're comfortable with their capacity to mitigate that risk. Fine.
Given that most of the problems with the CA system historically have not been active attacks but incompetence, I don't think we win much from moving to a system where we can, in fact, kick TURKTRUST out of the pool to one where the question is whether .tr remains part of the internet or not. If Verisign screws up with .com in any way short of revealing a letter from the FBI saying "Please help us MITM Windows Update," there will be immense pressure to allow Verisign to continue being the .com registry and continue holding the .com signing keys.
For similar reasons, I'm not convinced that moving from "Hundreds of unqualified companies could issue a bad cert, but hopefully they won't" to "One unqualified company could issue a bad cert, but hopefully it won't" is a meaningful benefit. It doesn't reduce the theoretical bounds on the attacks, and again in practice, these hundreds of companies haven't been misissuing. (The present story is about mis-delegating the power to issue revocation/non-revocation responses, which is certainly a problem, but only relevant in practice if there are actual end-entity certs that are misissued in the first place.) So while it certainly feels better to have fewer entities that can sign - and to be clear, I am all for distrusting many if not most of them - I don't think it addresses either the fundamental theoretical problems nor the actual real-world attacks.