In that case, perhaps the balance we need to strike is rhetorical, not technical.
I think some people in the tech world are 4th-amendment absolutists. That's not a new thing; in Cryptonomnicon there was the electromagnetic doorframe so strong that it would wipe drives passing through it. I don't know that it's a position I hold myself, but it's one I definitely respect.
But we have a multi-century history of the government being able to read people's documents once they have a warrant. A lot of crime-fighting makes use of this. Whatever the intricacies of the technology, there's a status quo that I think we should at least acknowledge.
So I think the rhetorical balance we need to strike as an industry is along the lines of, "Yes, we totally get why you would want to get into that terrorist's phone. We wish we could find a way to give you access to just that without compromising everything. But it's not like a wall we can put a special door in. It's like a balloon. The moment it loses integrity, it's worthless. We want to help you, but we can't."
When the message instead comes across as absolutist, I think we're in danger of losing public support. Without that, we'll have a very hard time resisting government demands for access.
Your message can basically be distilled into "it's absolutist but we can't let it come across that way to hurt our PR".
I'm not sure trying to increase the complexity of the issue just to make it sound like the technology community doesn't see this as binary is a good solution. I think what we need to do is education people around how encryption works.
If we're wishy-washy about the whole thing it may come off as something we can possibly do in the end. I think education is the only way. But that's just my opinion.
Some people on this are absolutists, and some aren't. If we could create a safe back door, some would be in favor of doing that, and some wouldn't. That's distinct from us not having a way to create a safe back door.
One problem I see us having (and I've seen this on Facebook) is that some people think that we are saying we can't create a safe back door because we don't want to. And I think they're getting that notion because of the people in the absolutist camp.
> If we could create a safe back door, some would be in favor of doing that, and some wouldn't. That's distinct from us not having a way to create a safe back door.
I've seen a tiny handful of comments like that and other comments about how they're fine if it isn't completely safe in order to "protect the country". Is there any data to even know for sure what the majority of common people think about encryption and backdoors?
I'm not convinced a near majority simply thinks that SV just "doesn't want to". Well except in maybe the current Apple vs FBI case as the FBI and some of the media are kinda shouting that. Perhaps that'll sway the tides and make more people think in that way, however?
Either way I still think trying to educate the populous is the best way to undermine the entire idea of escrow keys / backdoors.
I don't think a "near majority" needs to think that for this to be a useful approach.
When people can't engage on the substance, they fall back on human heuristics. E.g., bedside manner is important in doctors because people will generally stop listening to doctors they don't find trustworthy.
You're welcome to try to educate the populace on the subtleties of crypto. My guess is that the number of people who will sit still for that is pretty small, but maybe I'm wrong. In case I'm right, though, I think a useful backup would be displaying empathy for the (reasonable) societal goals that are driving this push for back doors.
I think some people in the tech world are 4th-amendment absolutists. That's not a new thing; in Cryptonomnicon there was the electromagnetic doorframe so strong that it would wipe drives passing through it. I don't know that it's a position I hold myself, but it's one I definitely respect.
But we have a multi-century history of the government being able to read people's documents once they have a warrant. A lot of crime-fighting makes use of this. Whatever the intricacies of the technology, there's a status quo that I think we should at least acknowledge.
So I think the rhetorical balance we need to strike as an industry is along the lines of, "Yes, we totally get why you would want to get into that terrorist's phone. We wish we could find a way to give you access to just that without compromising everything. But it's not like a wall we can put a special door in. It's like a balloon. The moment it loses integrity, it's worthless. We want to help you, but we can't."
When the message instead comes across as absolutist, I think we're in danger of losing public support. Without that, we'll have a very hard time resisting government demands for access.