A bit over a decade ago I used to spend a lot of time hacking North Korean web infrastructure, I mostly found that they tended to have firewalling around almost all boxes exposed to the global internet and usually had pretty impressive reaction times if you tried to access the country intranet through a compromised web server.
I've always wondered how successful NSA and the likes have been at infiltrating DPRK networks, as it would inherently be fairly easy to detect any sketchy traffic from the outside. I wonder if the recent NYT story essentially confirms that difficulty.
I guess I have a question after all: I'm not exactly clear on how NK treats end-user devices. Do you know if the endpoints used by NK based remote workers have internet and intranet access at the same time? If they do, such an endpoint could offer an easy and stealthy channel to access the intranet.
the end user devices are also really interesting. as far as i know they require a piece of software called netkey or oconnect as it's recently been renamed. that's for getting access inside the country and then for anyone outside they have software called hangro that is similar to a vpn for connecting back to north korea and getting messages
thanks really appreciate that!
I've seen that doc before and it does really make me wonder. part of the leaks from the NSA tools years back had some references in there for detecting north koreas ant-virus silivaccine
I assume they've been on their networks in the past but i think North Korea has also done a lot over the years to secure their side. it used to be a lot easier when they left everything as an open directory and didn't realize what they were doing.
South Korean NIS was in fact a hacking team client, so it would make sense. Especially considering how terrible Red Star OS was at the time, a HT engineer could probably have whipped those up in a couple of days.
>I assume they've been on their networks in the past but i think North Korea has also done a lot over the years to secure their side. it used to be a lot easier when they left everything as an open directory and didn't realize what they were doing.
I'm sure they've had some success, but I'd expect it to be a really difficult environment to operate in. Even for the NSA. I suppose eventually there'll be a better leak and we'll get to find out just how well it's been going.
It's like the NSA Reddit, they've got memes and up- and downvotes.
Some excerpts from a seemingly unreleased Snowden leak (from Dark mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State):
> “Why is a scoop of potatoes larger than a scoop of eggs in the cafeteria?” a contributor named Michael wondered one day. Paul jumped in to play the troll. “Let me be the first to down-vote you,” Paul wrote, naming several pedantic reasons. A side debate erupted: should Michael’s post be down-voted, flagged, or removed? Clyde returned to the topic at hand with a facetious theory that scoop volume is proportional to the relative size of potatoes and eggs themselves. In that case, Scott replied, what would happen if “we served eggs that were bigger than potatoes, like of an Ostrich?” Someone proposed a uniform system, “One Spoon to scoop them all,” an homage to Lord of the Rings. Punsters demanded the “inside scoop” and lamented the waste of time on “small potatoes.”
Gotta say, it's pretty disappointing that Gellman, Greenwald, Poltras et. al. have been so stingy with these documents. It's definitely starting to have been long enough for them to just dump everything.
It's interesting to discover the reality that packet routing ends up following political affiliations. I didn't know North Korea only has 1,024 IPv4 addresses. Do you know why so few IPs? How did they get them?
> It's interesting to discover the reality that packet routing ends up following political affiliations.
Certainly political affiliations have some influence, but also China and Russia have land borders with North Korea and are not at war. It's very common to run fiber optic on/under railroads and vehicle roads, so there you go. It's probably pretty hard to attract an international cable consortium to land in North Korea given everything, but terrestrial cabling is easier to start with anyway.
> I didn't know North Korea only has 1,024 IPv4 addresses. Do you know why so few IPs? How did they get them?
They would have asked APNIC, the Regional Internet address Registry for their region (Asia-Pacific). I can't find an assignment date, but 175/8 was assigned to APNIC in 2009. 2009 lines up with wikipedia reporting of the startup of the current ISP joint venture.
DPRK can certainly get however many IP addresses they want, DPRK just doesn't have that much infrastructure that they want externally accessible.
As far as I know, end-user traffic from within North Korea usually does not originate from those few IP addresses. Or at least not visibly so, they might be connecting to a proxy from a DPRK IP address.
IPv4 continues to be available to entities that have a need that fits a particular policy shape, just most people don't.
Specifically, you can get IPv4 /24s for IPv6 transition purposes. This includes anycast DNS, MX, etc for legacy clients on other networks, v4-side of CGNAT, etc.
E.g. I was able to get a /24 in the ARIN region in 2021 and could justify 2 more for a _logical_ network topology similar to what NK presents to the world.
APNIC has some addresses [1] and will assign up to two /24s to qualified new accounts within the region. There are also carve outs for National Internet Registries and Internet eXchange Points.
Apnic used to hand out a /22 to most members. Its now a waiting list for 2 /24s. They would probably give some priority to a nation state over yet another mdu fibre isp.
... although in the case of 통보문 there are no exact matches. It appears in KEEK.db in the definitions of various English entries related to messaging, and in biyak.db as a component of messaging-related terms.
So you would need to query with something like
SELECT * FROM dictionary WHERE word LIKE '%통보문%' OR definition LIKE '%통보문%';
for maximum recall.
(Aside: I came across that blog post while looking for a Korean dictionary I could just download and use offline; for better or worse, North Korea seems big on offline-first applications. I ended up repackaging it as an HTML file I can use easily on my phone: https://github.com/Yorwba/dic.html )
Are there any suspicious blanks in the map or missing buildings? Apparently the North Korean leadership don't like to be reminded of the unfinished Ryugyong Hotel[1], or more prosaically there may be missing military sites and the like.
[1] From Wikipedia: "The government manipulated official photographs in order to remove the unfinished structure from the skyline, and excluded it from printed maps of Pyongyang" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ryugyong_Hotel)
>However, not everything is detailed. In addition to numerous buildings having no labels, sensitive areas of the city, such as the Korean Workers’ Party complex in central Pyongyang and the Mirim Parade Training Ground, have no details, roads or building outlines.
Instead of trying to decode the password from the huge decompiled file, can you use a debugger to intercept the call to sqliteopen? Or shim it out?
I’m not familiar with Android development enough to know this is possible but this is what I’d do in x86 world - so just thought I’d offer a suggestion
