Excuse my ignorance... You're saying that if someone blocks you on Twitter you're no longer allowed to post something with their @handle? Or that they, as the blocker, just won't see it?
If it's the former, then I would agree with you. If it's the latter, and you're not actually blocked from posting (saying) anything, then where exactly is the violation?
Server stores hashed-password, hash-salt, and random-salt.
Server sends hash-salt, and random-salt to client.
Client uses user password and hash-salt to generate hashed-password.
Client hashes hashed-password using random-salt.
Client sends hashed-hashed-password to server.
Server grabs stored hashed-password and hashes used stored random-salt to check for match against client's hashed-hashed-password.
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So the only thing this actually does is not share the text of the password that the user typed to the server. But at a technical level, now the hashed-password is the new "password".
Let's say the database is compromised. The attacker has the hashed-password. They make a login request to fetch the random-salt, hash their stolen hashed-password with it and send that to the server. Owned.
Along with being more complicated with no real gain, this also takes the hashing away from the server-side, which is a big negative, as the time that it takes to hash a password is a control method used to mitigate attacks.
Just send the plain-text password over HTTPS and hash it the moment it hits the server. There's no issue with this technique (as long as it's not logged!)
This is true. It does prevent an attacker from reusing a password they recover from your logs. But as others have pointed out a DB breach means all your users are compromised. Thank you.
No, random-salt is not stored permanently but generated at random by the server every time a client is about to authenticate. Alternatively a timestamp would be just as good.
The random-salt has to be stored, at least for the length of the authentication request, because the server needs to generate the same hashed-hashed-password as the client to be able to match and authenticate.
> Alternatively a timestamp would be just as good.
I don't see how that would work at all.
I also don't see the need to go any further in detail about how this scheme will not be better than the current best practices.
A timestamp would work the same way it works in (e.g.) Google Authenticator.
Incidentally, I really resent how it's impossible to have a discussion of anything at all related to cryptography on HN without somebody bringing up the "never roll your own crypto" dogma.
If the ideas being proposed are bad, please point out why, don't just imply that everyone except you is too stupid to understand.
Edit:
I just reread your comment above and you did a perfectly good job of explaining why it's a bad idea, I must have misunderstood first time round: it's a bad idea because now the login credentials get compromised in a database leak instead of a MITM, which is both more common in practice and affects more users at once.
Sorry for saying you didn't explain why it is a bad idea.
Years ago they did not delete accounts. They would deactivate it and never delete the data. They do now (apparently), but in the past they were very openly not deleting anything.
Yes, I read it. I took it as meaning that they either read something else which was unclear, or just deactivated the account, or misremember what Facebook said at the time.
Do we know that Facebook actually deletes accounts now?
Perhaps that's why you aren't asked?